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The Realpolitik of Nuclear Risk: When Political 
Expediency Trumps Technical Democracy
HIRO SAITO and SANG-HYOUN PAHK
In recent years, a growing number of researchers in science and technology studies have begun to 
examine the relationship between science and politics. Specifically, they focus on citizen participation 
in highly technical policy problems and explore the possibility of a technical democracy that avoids 
pitfalls of technocracy. This focus, however, downplays a possibly more serious obstacle to technical 
democracy than technocracy, namely, realpolitik. Based on ethnographic and textual data on citizen–
government interactions in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, we first show 
how citizens mobilised radiation detectors and counter-experts to force the Japanese government 
to admit scientific uncertainty about the permissible dose limit. We then explain why this successful 
mobilisation nonetheless had only a small impact on evacuation and compensation policies in 
terms of the pre-disaster structure of Japanese politics: the dominance of commission-based policy- 
making allowed the bureaucratic government to play realpolitik in the face of scientific uncertainty to 
expediently pursue its own interest, circumventing both democratic deliberation and technical rigour.
Over the past two decades, the field of science and technology studies (STS) 
made a ‘participatory’ turn (Jasanoff, 2003a; Lengwiler, 2008) to study non-expert, 
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citizen participation in the governance of science and technology. Part and parcel 
of the participatory turn is the research on ‘technical democracy’ by promi-
nent STS scholars Bruno Latour (1999) and Michel Callon and his colleagues 
(Callon, Lascoumes & Barthe, 2009). In light of the inextricable connections 
between science and politics, these STS scholars have explored how scientific 
practices, which are often esoteric, can be effectively integrated into the process 
of policymaking to strengthen, rather than weaken, democratic politics. This 
question also has been addressed by other prominent STS scholars (Collins & 
Evans, 2008; Jasanoff, 2003b) and political theorists (Fischer, 2009; Schudson, 2006; 
Turner, 2003) who are concerned about the role of scientific expertise in democratic 
decision-making.
This theoretical question turned into an urgent practical problem in Japan after 
the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami triggered the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Disaster on 11 March 2011. The nuclear disaster caused a wide variety of 
highly technical policy problems: to name but a few, how to monitor the long-term 
health of disaster victims, how to decontaminate the land and how to decommis-
sion the destroyed nuclear reactors. These policy problems, however, call into 
question the framing of the theoretical question. While a majority of STS scholars 
have proposed technical democracy as an alternative to technocracy, wherein 
experts dominate non-expert citizens in the process of policymaking, post-disaster 
Japanese politics shows that not only technical democracy, but also technocracy 
is largely suppressed. In the face of scientific uncertainty, politics seems to have 
turned to the logic of realpolitik driven by political expediency.
In this article, then, we first show how Fukushima residents mobilised radia-
tion detectors and counter-experts to challenge the permissible dose limit set by 
the Japanese government to determine its evacuation and compensation policies. 
We then explain why this mobilisation nonetheless had only a small impact on 
the government: the logic of realpolitik dominated policymaking due to the 
pre-disaster structure of Japanese politics that allowed the bureaucratic govern-
ment to ceremonially use expert commissions to circumvent both democratic 
deliberation and technical rigor. Put another way, the possibility of technical 
democracy cannot be envisioned simply as an alternative to technocracy. STS 
scholars need to pay more attention to the serious obstacles imposed by realpoli-
tik, perhaps the default mode of politics ready to brush aside scientific uncertainty 
in favour of expediency.
From Technocracy to Technical Democracy? What about Realpolitik?
As Max Weber (1947) recognised a century ago, modern mass democracy cannot 
function effectively without bureaucrats cum administrative experts. Government 
ministries and agencies accumulate a wide range of information on the population 
and the know-how of legal codes, both of which are indispensable for identifying 
policy problems and proposing their solutions. As a result, elected politicians depend 
heavily on bureaucrats in the process of policymaking. Importantly, bureaucrats 
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are not the only group of experts in policymaking. Given the growing role of sci-
ence and technology in society, bureaucrats increasingly consult with scientists 
in formulating policies to deal with highly technical problems. This consultation 
generally involves the establishment of a commission consisting of those who are 
regarded as possessing scientific expertise relevant to specific policy problems 
(Collins & Evans, 2008; Fischer, 2009; Turner, 2003).
This institutional set-up of modern mass democracy creates, as Jürgen Habermas 
put it, ‘a pretext for a technocratic incapacitation of the public sphere’ (1998, 
p. 373), wherein administrative experts commission scientific experts to formu-
late policies while dispensing with democratic deliberation involving citizens. 
This technocratic domination can happen because the government tends to 
commission scientists already known to be sympathetic to its policy positions 
(Jasanoff, 2003b) and these ‘official experts’ can invoke ‘scientific truths’ to 
authoritatively foreclose objections from citizens.
Since STS scholars are acutely aware of this danger of technocracy (Collins & 
Evans, 2002; Latour, 1999, 2004a), they have advocated ‘participatory approaches’ 
to examine the existing mechanisms for citizen participation in highly techni-
cal policy domains and explored how these mechanisms can be made more 
democratic (Lengwiler, 2008). Among these STS scholars, Michel Callon and his 
colleagues (2009) advanced perhaps the most comprehensive framework to criti-
cally evaluate the roles of citizens and scientists in policymaking processes. They 
believe that the key to integrating scientific expertise and citizen participation 
is to mobilise ‘researchers in the wild’, ordinary citizens who have become experts 
on specific technical problems, and to generate dialogues between these citizens and 
other relevant political actors such as bureaucrats and credentialed scientists. One 
promising way to pursue such a ‘technical democracy’ is to institutionalise ‘hybrid 
forums’, wherein the government will embrace ‘[w]ider, more diversified, more 
frequent, and deeper consultations’ with citizens and formulate policies informed 
by the widest possible range of scientific knowledges and moral values held by 
members of a given polity (Callon et al., 2009, p. 259).
As Sheila Jasanoff observed, however, much of the STS research on politics 
has focused on ‘who wins and who loses in particular struggles over representa-
tion’ while ignoring more conventional political questions pertaining to ‘who 
benefits, to what ends, by what means, and at how great a cost’ (2012, p. 439). As 
a result, STS scholars tend to underestimate the danger of realpolitik, ‘a positive, 
materialist, no-nonsense, interest only, matter-of-fact way of dealing with naked 
power relations’ (Latour, 2005, p. 14). Of course, realpolitik in the realist sense, 
politics driven by the objective law of strategic pursuit of interest defined as power 
(Gilpin, 1984), is unrealistic. Such a realist theory of politics has been challenged 
by constructivist political scientists (e.g., Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001) who argue 
that ‘interest’ is intersubjectively constructed and political actions can be moti-
vated by principled ideas, norms and values, as well as rejected by STS scholars 
(Callon & Latour, 1981; Latour, 2004a) who demonstrate that ‘interest’, ‘naked 
power relations’ and ‘matters of fact’ are all constructed and stabilised with the 
Science, Technology & Society 21:1 (2016): 5–23
8   Hiro Saito and Sang-Hyoun Pahk
help of buildings, weapons, recording devices, laboratories and many other non-
humans. But, even though social scientists succeed in analytically ‘unscrewing 
the big Leviathan’, the government can, in practice, still ‘black box’ policymaking 
processes that define its interest and mobilise the existing technologies of power 
to dominate citizens. Realpolitik in this constructivist sense is therefore possible. 
In fact, as Michael Schudson (2006) pointed out, politicians and bureaucrats can 
distort or even ignore available scientific findings in favour of their own interests. 
This is not technocracy but realpolitik that strategically appropriates science 
in the pursuit of power.
Thus, we argue that if the discussion of technical democracy continues to be 
framed only in relation to the danger of technocracy that shortcuts democratic 
deliberation through scientific expertise, it will fail to fully consider another danger 
in democratic societies, that is, realpolitik capable of dodging both democratic 
deliberation and scientific expertise in favour of political expediency. In short, 
is it technocracy or realpolitik that will pose a greater threat to the possibility of 
technical democracy?
Background, Methods and Data
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster offers extensive data to examine the 
question. The nuclear disaster was triggered by a massive earthquake (9.0 on the 
moment magnitude scale) that occurred off the Pacific coast of the northeastern 
part of Japan’s mainland on 11 March 2011. More than 140,000 Fukushima 
residents evacuated from their homes as of September 2011, which exceeded the 
total number of evacuees in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia within one year after 
the 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster (NAIIC, 2012, pp. 349–81). This massive 
nuclear disaster—designated as a ‘major accident’, the same level as the Chernobyl 
disaster, according to the event scale of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA)—thus caused a wide range of highly technical, intertwined policy prob-
lems. A long list of these problems includes: how to decommission the destroyed 
nuclear reactors, how to evacuate Fukushima residents and compensate them, how 
to reform Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), an operator of the Fukushima 
Daiichi, how to improve Japan’s nuclear safety, and so on. Ongoing policy debates 
on these problems provide fertile ground for exploring the possibility of technical 
democracy.
Among these policy problems, we decided to examine the problem of how 
to evacuate and compensate Fukushima residents. We chose this policy problem 
because it pertains to arguably the most urgent ‘matters of concern’ in post-disaster 
Japan—damages to the lives and livelihoods of Fukushima residents—and we, as 
social scientists, felt that we had the responsibility to study these matters of concern 
and represent them to the public (Latour, 2000, 2004b). Specifically, to explore 
the possibility of technical democracy vis-à-vis technocracy and realpolitik, we 
focused on the interactions between citizens and the government and how these 
interactions did or did not influence the government’s evacuation and compensa-
tion policies.
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To document these interactions, we collected two kinds of data between 
March 2011, when a group of Fukushima residents began to challenge both scien-
tific and non-scientific grounds for the government’s evacuation and compensation 
policies, and December 2011, when the government amended its initial policies 
in response to the residents’ challenge. The first kind of data is ethnographic. From 
September 2011 through December 2011, the first author conducted fieldwork 
in Tokyo, Japan. He worked twice a week as a volunteer for the Friends of the 
Earth (FoE) Japan, an environmental NGO that served as the secretariat of ‘e-shift’, 
a network of NGOs launched in April 2011 to press the government to minimise 
the damages of the nuclear disaster.1 By volunteering for FoE Japan and e-shift, 
the first author documented real-time interactions between citizens and the 
government. To complement the ethnographic method, we also collected textual 
data. Specifically, we tried to trace the interactions between citizens and the 
government by looking at various types of digitally archived materials: reports 
and blog posts published by NGOs summarising negotiations between citizens and 
the government; minutes of meetings of the Dispute Reconciliation Committee 
for Nuclear Damage Compensation, an organisation responsible for setting com-
pensation guidelines; and news articles in local newspapers Fukushima Minpō 
and Fukushima Minyū. In short, by using these ethnographic and textual data, we 
reconstructed a timeline of the interactions between citizens and the government 
from March to December 2011.
Citizens’ Initial Reaction to the Government’s Evacuation Policy
In response to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, the Japanese government 
issued its first evacuation order at 9:23 pm on 11 March 2011: residents within a 
3 km radius from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant must evacuate from 
their homes while those within a 3−10 km radius must stay inside their homes. 
On 12 March, the government then expanded the evacuation zone to a 10 km 
radius at 5:44 am and to a 20 km radius at 6:25 pm. Since the Fukushima Daiichi 
continued to release radioactivity, at 11:00 am on 15 March, the government 
proceeded to order residents within a 20−30 km radius to stay inside to minimise 
their exposure to radioactivity. Eventually, on 25 March, the government requested 
that residents within 30 km radius to voluntarily evacuate from their homes (for 
a summary of evacuation orders, see RJIF, 2012, p. 188). While the government 
issued these evacuation orders, it repeated the phrase, ‘this level of radioactivity 
is not immediately harmful’, asking citizens not to panic out of excessive fear 
(Asahi Shinbun, 13 March 2011).
In the meantime, antinuclear NGOs began to question the government’s evacu-
ation policy. On 17 March, Mihamanokai, an Osaka-based NGO opposing nuclear 
power plants in the Kansai area, examined the government’s radiation-monitoring 
data and pointed out high levels of radioactivity in areas outside the evacuation 
zone.2 They also pointed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulation Commission’s recommen-
dation for American citizens to evacuate from an 80 km radius of the Fukushima 
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Daiichi and urged the Japanese government to expand the evacuation zone.3 Then, 
on 24 March, a total of 168 NGOs across Japan, led by Mihamanokai, jointly sub-
mitted an open letter to Prime Minister Kan Naoto, demanding the government 
should explain what exactly ‘the level of radioactivity [that] is not immediately 
harmful’ meant.4 On the following day, four antinuclear NGOs—Mihamanokai, 
Green Action, Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center and Fukurounokai—began 
to lobby Diet members to expand the evacuation zone for children and pregnant 
women who were particularly vulnerable to radioactivity.5
In addition, Fukurounokai, an NGO that had opposed the nuclear power plants in 
Fukushima, collaborated with Green Action and the Japan Consumer Association to 
deliver four radiation detectors to Fukushima Prefecture by 30 March.6 A group of 
residents in Fukushima City—who formed a new NGO ‘Fukushima Reconstruction 
Council’—used one of these radiation detectors to survey levels of radioactivity in 
schools on 29 and 30 March because they were concerned about their children’s 
health. On the following day, they requested the governor and the board of educa-
tion of Fukushima Prefecture to conduct a comprehensive survey of radioactivity 
in schools to prepare effective measures of radiological protection for school-age 
children.7
The prefectural government of Fukushima conducted radiation surveys in 
elementary and junior high schools between 5 and 7 April and published the results 
on 8 April. The Fukushima Reconstruction Council examined the results and pointed 
out that the level of radioactivity was approximately 0.6 μSv per hour (equivalent 
to a radiation controlled area) in fourteen municipalities and exceeded 2.3 μSv 
per hour (equivalent to the five-year dose limit for radiation workers) in twelve 
municipalities—outside of the evacuation zone. The council then demanded that 
more municipalities in Fukushima be included in the evacuation zone.8
In the meantime, the national government debated on how to consolidate the exist-
ing evacuation orders into a more coherent policy. On 5 April, the Nuclear Safety 
Commission (NSC) began to consider raising the effective dose limit for residents 
in highly polluted areas from 1 mSv per year—under normal circumstances—to 
20 mSv per year and on 6 April, the Cabinet began to discuss whether to expand 
the evacuation zone (Asahi Shinbun, 7 March 2011). On 19 April, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) finally announced 
its policy on the use of school facilities in Fukushima Prefecture: schools should 
remain open unless the effective dose was projected to exceed 20 mSv per year 
and outdoor activities should be permitted unless the level of radioactivity on 
school grounds exceeded 3.8 μSv per hour. MEXT claimed that the dose limit of 
20 mSv per year was consistent with the standard recommended by the Inter- 
national Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP).9 MEXT’s policy was 
also endorsed by Yamashita Shun’ichi, a medical doctor who advised Fukushima 
Prefecture with regard to radiological protection: ‘An effective dose of 20 mSv 
per year has virtually no effect on humans. I want parents not to panic and instead 
to calmly accept MEXT’s dose limit’ (Asahi Shinbun, 20 April 2011).
Then, on 22 April 2011, the national government established its evacuation 
policy by creating three kinds of evacuation zones: ‘restricted area’, a 20 km 
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radius from the Fukushima Daiichi, where residents were required to evacuate; 
‘deliberate evacuation area’, where residents were also required to evacuate 
because an effective dose was projected to exceed 20 mSv within a year; and 
‘evacuation prepared area’, a 20–30 km radius, where people would be required 
to stay inside or evacuate in emergency situations. Thus, the government adopted 
20 mSv per year as the threshold to justify its policy on evacuation and the 
use of school facilities.
Citizens’ Challenge to the Official Dose Limit for School-age Children
In response, on 22 April, the Fukushima Reconstruction Council, Fukurounokai, 
Mihamanokai and Green Action held a meeting with MEXT and NSC. The NGOs 
demanded that the government should adopt a dose limit lower than 20 mSv per 
year for children, given their vulnerability to radioactivity.10 In Fukushima too, 
about 250 residents attended a meeting organised by the Fukushima Reconstruction 
Council on 1 May and created the Fukushima Network for Saving Children from 
Radiation to collectively tackle a variety of issues, such as evacuation, decon-
tamination and radiological protection for children.11 These Fukushima residents 
joined forces with Fukurounokai, Mihamanokai, Green Action and FoE Japan 
and held another meeting with MEXT, NSC and the Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare on 2 May. This meeting galvanised Fukushima residents and NGOs 
because MEXT and NSC turned out to disagree with each other: MEXT insisted 
on the validity of 20 mSv per year as a dose limit for children because ICRP made 
no distinction between adults and minors, whereas NSC stated that they never 
approved MEXT’s dose limit.12
In fact, experts were divided over the validity of 20 mSv per year as a dose 
limit for children. ‘Official experts’ aligned with MEXT defended it. Most notably, 
Yamashita Shun’ichi delivered multiple lectures in the aftermath of the nuclear 
disaster, telling Fukushima residents, ‘There will be no nuclear damage to your 
health’, ‘If you are smiling, you won’t be affected by radioactivity’ and ‘It’s okay 
to receive a dose of 100 mSv’. But other medical experts disagreed. To begin with, 
Kosako Toshisō, a professor of nuclear engineering who served as a Cabinet advisor, 
resigned from his post on 29 April, criticising MEXT’s dose limit for school-age 
children as ‘unacceptable from both scientific and humanitarian perspectives’.13 
On the same day, the Washington-based international NGO Physicians for Social 
Responsibility issued a statement questioning MEXT’s dose limit. This statement 
was partially translated into Japanese and circulated by FoE Japan.14 Similarly, 
an open letter by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War was 
translated into Japanese and circulated by anti-nuclear NGOs in Japan.15 The Japan 
Medical Association also issued a statement on 12 May, requesting that the national 
government lower the dose limit for school-age children.16
Fukushima residents and antinuclear NGOs not only disseminated these 
expert opinions critical of the government’s policy but also mobilised their own 
‘counter-experts’ to demand a lower dose limit for children. In mid-April, the 
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Fukushima Reconstruction Council, Fukurounokai and other antinuclear NGOs 
sampled soil and sent it to Association pour le Contrôle de la Radioactivité 
dans l’Ouest (ACRO), a French NGO that was created in the aftermath of the 
Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster and specialised in the measurement of radioactivity. 
On 18 May, Fukurounokai published the results of ACRO’s radioactivity analysis 
and pointed out that the level of soil contamination across Fukushima exceeded 
185,000 becquerel per square metre, equivalent to the zone with the right of reset-
tlement in Belarus.17 Moreover, between April and June, multiple seminars on 
radiological protection were conducted in Fukushima and Tokyo by Sakiyama 
Hisako, a medical doctor and former research scientist at the National Institute 
of Radiological Sciences who had joined Takagi School, an anti-nuclear NGO 
closely working with Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center. At these seminars, 
Sakiyama criticised ICRP and the Japanese government for refusing to take into 
account ‘internal irradiation’ and thereby underestimating the health risks of 
radioactivity. She also argued that there was no objectively ‘safe’ dose limit and 
urged the government to lower the limit for children, given their vulnerability to 
radioactivity (Sakiyama & Takagi Gakkō, 2011).
Armed with counter-expertise, 650 Fukushima residents and six anti-
nuclear NGOs—the Fukushima Network for Saving Children from Radiation, 
Fukurounokai, Mihamanokai, FoE Japan, Green Action and Greenpeace Japan—
held another meeting with MEXT on 23 May.18 In response, on 25 May, MEXT 
promised to ‘make efforts to lower the dose limit at schools to less than 1 mSv per 
year’ and to provide financial assistance to decontaminate soil on school grounds.19 
Thus, by mobilising radiation detectors and counter-experts, Fukushima residents 
succeeded in gaining a concession from the government.
Citizens’ Challenge to the Government’s Compensation Policy
In addition to challenging MEXT’s dose limit, Fukushima residents and anti-nuclear 
NGOs pressed the Japanese government to expand its coverage of compensation 
for damages caused by the nuclear disaster. The government set up the Dispute 
Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation (DRC) on 11 April 
2011, according to the Act on Nuclear Damage Compensation. DRC’s purpose 
was to (a) survey and assess nuclear damages, (b) provide guidelines for TEPCO 
in dealing with nuclear damage compensation and (c) mediate disputes between 
TEPCO and victims of the nuclear disaster.20 MEXT served as DRC’s secretariat 
and appointed six law professors, three medical researchers and one nuclear 
physicist. DRC was chaired by Noumi Yoshihisa, a specialist of civil law. Prior to 
every meeting, DRC’s secretariat, MEXT, set an agenda and drafted compensation 
guidelines for a given issue, while DRC members discussed the draft guidelines, 
asked clarification questions and suggested modifications. The secretariat then 
incorporated these suggested modifications and brought revised guidelines and 
a new agenda to the next meeting. The most important factor in determining the 
compensation guidelines was the government’s evacuation policy that adopted 
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20 mSv per year as the threshold for requiring residents to evacuate. This was 
why citizens’ challenges to the government’s evacuation and compensation poli-
cies were intertwined.
To draft compensation guidelines, DRC began collecting information about 
nuclear damages. The most readily legible damage was of an economic kind. 
Already at the first meeting, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
and the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport reported how agriculture 
and tourism industries suffered economic losses due to the evacuation orders and 
permissible levels of radioactivity in foodstuff.21 Since these ministries already had 
strong connections with trade associations in industries under their jurisdictions, 
they could quickly report relevant economic losses to DRC in order to influence 
its compensation guidelines. Another readily legible damage was of a human kind, 
suffered by Fukushima residents who evacuated from official evacuation zones. At 
the first and second DRC meetings, MEXT bureaucrats shared the latest information 
on situations of official evacuees and at the third meeting on 28 April the lieutenant 
governor of Fukushima Prefecture reported evacuees’ living conditions, moving 
expenses and mental health, among other things.22
Given the information on economic and human damages, DRC issued its First 
Guidelines on 28 April by specifying the following damages as eligible for com- 
pensation: damages caused by official evacuation orders (e.g., moving expenses, 
loss of employment) and by official safety orders (e.g., loss of profits due to radio-
activity in foodstuff that exceeded the official permissible limits). However, since 
the First Guidelines responded only to the most readily legible damages, DRC also 
promised to keep updating its compensation guidelines in light of new information.23 
In fact, as soon as DRC issued its First Guidelines, it began to draft the next one. 
At the fourth DRC meeting on 16 May, mayors of Ōkuma (a restricted area) and 
Kawauchi (a deliberate evacuation area) were called to testify about the situations of 
their towns and they requested that DRC expand the definition of nuclear damages 
by adopting a long-term perspective.24 At the same meeting, representatives of 
several trade associations in agriculture, commerce, fishery and small businesses 
were also called to report their economic losses and they too requested that DRC 
expand the scope of compensation in drafting its Second Guidelines.
Since DRC initially focused on nuclear damages that were readily visible to the 
government, it did not pay attention to ‘voluntary evacuees’, Fukushima residents 
who lived outside of the evacuation zone but nonetheless decided to evacuate from 
their homes. Approximately 40,000 Fukushima residents evacuated voluntarily in 
March.25 There were also other residents who wanted to voluntarily evacuate but 
decided to stay due to economic constraints and familial obligations. Importantly, 
many of those who wanted to voluntarily evacuate had children. This was why 
Fukushima residents who spearheaded the criticism of MEXT’s dose limit for 
school-age children were also the ones who demanded compensation for voluntary 
evacuation.
Their demand was galvanised by the radiation survey that the city govern-
ment of Fukushima conducted in mid-June: six out of 1,118 sampling spots 
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recorded 3.52–6.65 μSv per hour. Residents near these spots received no 
evacuation order, whereas residents in adjacent Date City who lived near spots 
with 3.2 μSv per hour (the projected annual dose of 20 mSv) as of June 2011 
were designated as eligible for evacuation according to the new scheme called 
‘Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation’ (Fukushima Minyū, 1 July 2011). 
Then, between late June and early July, more results of radioactivity analysis by 
counter-experts came in. On 30 June, the Fukushima Network, Fukurounokai 
and four other antinuclear NGOs published the results of ACRO’s urinalysis of 
children in Fukushima (aged from six to sixteen), demonstrating the internal 
irradiation from caesium 134 and 137.26 On 5 July, the same six NGOs also published 
results of a radiation survey conducted by Yamauchi Tomoya, a professor at Kobe 
University specialised in radiation measurements: the level of soil contamination 
in four spots in Fukushima City were equivalent to the levels in the ‘zone with the 
right of resettlement’ (185–555 kilobecquerel per square metre or a residual dose 
of 1–5 mSv per year) and the ‘zone of obligatory settlement’ (555 kilobecquerel 
per square metre or a residual dose of 5 mSv per year) in the aftermath of the 
Chernobyl disaster.27
Finally, on 15 July, the six antinuclear NGOs managed to meet with the DRC 
secretariat. They relayed comments and requests from voluntary evacuees and 
demanded that DRC recognise ‘the right to evacuate’ and compensate the voluntary 
evacuees because the government’s dose limit, 20 mSv per year, was scientifically 
uncertain and, in fact, too high to protect Fukushima residents, especially children 
and pregnant women.28 Moreover, just as these NGOs began to frame the issue of 
compensation for voluntary evacuees by using the language of rights, lawyers in 
Fukushima and Tokyo created the Save Fukushima Children Lawyers’ Network on 
20 July to support the rights to evacuate: ‘We believe that each citizen should be 
allowed to decide whether or not to evacuate….And when people decide to evacu-
ate, their decision should be respected and protected with governmental support’.29 
To inform the government of how voluntary evacuees were struggling, FoE Japan 
and Fukurounokai also published results of survey interviews with 272 voluntary 
evacuees on 25 July and organised a protest with voluntary evacuees in front of the 
DRC secretariat on 29 July.30 These actions led DRC to decide to deliberate on a 
compensation scheme for voluntary evacuees at their thirteenth meeting on 5 August.
The Government’s Revision of Compensation Policy
The central question for DRC was the ‘rationality’ of voluntary evacuation. As the 
DRC secretariat stated on 5 August,
If it’s socially rational for people outside of the evacuation zone to take actions to 
avoid radioactivity, they could be eligible to compensation. Criteria to determine 
such rationality may include the distance from the nuclear power plant in the 
immediate aftermath of the accident and the level of radioactivity afterwards, but 
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it’s unclear whether there is any proper criterion to judge rationality of voluntary 
evacuation independent of the government’s evacuation orders.31
Originally, the DRC secretariat suggested that DRC members consider the rationality 
of voluntary evacuation by distinguishing between two groups: those who evacuated 
in the immediate aftermath of the disaster because they lacked sufficient information 
and those who later evacuated to minimise the health impact of long-term expo-
sure to low doses of radiation. The secretariat also suggested that DRC members 
examine questions such as how voluntary evacuees should be compensated in com-
parison with official evacuees and whether it was more rational for certain people 
(e.g., parents with children) to evacuate voluntarily.32
It was relatively easy for DRC members to agree that those who voluntarily 
evacuated from a 20–30 km radius from the Fukushima Daiichi—the areas where 
residents were ordered to stay inside until 22 April and prepare for evacuation 
in emergency situations afterwards—could be considered ‘rational’. However, 
DRC members had difficulty agreeing on criteria for judging when voluntary 
evacuation from these areas would cease to be rational and whether volun- 
tary evacuation outside of these areas should be considered rational. Initially, 
some members suggested that ICRP’s recommendation, such as 20 mSv per year 
or 100 mSv per lifetime, should be used as a criterion, but this suggestion was 
quickly and forcefully rejected by the two scientists on the committee: Yonekura 
Yoshiharu, a medical scientist and president of the National Institute of Radiological 
Sciences, and Tanaka Shun’ichi, a nuclear physicist and president of the Research 
Organization for Information Science and Technology (and later chairperson of the 
Nuclear Regulation Authority). Yonekura was sympathetic to voluntary evacuees 
who felt 20 mSv per year had been too high, especially for children and pregnant 
women, because the threshold was ‘an incidental result of averaging the doses 
that radiation workers receive over five years’.33 Tanaka agreed with Yonekura and 
argued, ‘I don’t think 100 mSv per lifetime is recognised as valid internationally. 
So, I think it’s problematic to use it as a compensation criterion’.34 Thus, among 
the DRC members, scientists most clearly recognised scientific uncertainty about 
the threshold that the government used in determining the evacuation policy.
To dodge the scientific uncertainty, the DRC secretariat proposed to consider 
not only the level of radioactivity, but also other, non-scientific factors in decid-
ing in which area voluntary evacuation should be considered ‘rational’. To this 
end, at the sixteenth meeting on 10 November, the secretariat suggested that 
municipality should be used as a unit for identifying areas in which voluntary 
evacuation was rational. Nakajima Hajime, a law professor on the committee, 
agreed because ‘using municipality as a unit will help create statistics and keep 
track of compensation payment, among other things’.35 Nomura Toyohiro, another 
law professor, also believed that ‘using local community as a unit will probably 
best minimise various costs of dispute reconciliation’.36 Thus, ‘administrative 
convenience’ was brought in as a decisive factor to define the rationality of 
voluntary evacuation.
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Having delineated specific municipalities to be eligible for compensation 
of voluntary evacuation, DRC proceeded to debate the amount and length of 
compensation at the seventeenth meeting on 25 November. Recognising the het-
erogeneity of voluntary evacuees, the DRC secretariat proposed to calculate the 
amount of compensation by considering the three most common damages associ-
ated with voluntary evacuation: increased living expenses, psychological pain and 
moving expenses.37 DRC members not only wanted to provide the same amount 
of compensation for both those who voluntarily evacuated and those who stayed, 
but they were also concerned about how to make compensation for voluntary 
evacuees consistent with the existing scheme defined in the mid-term guidelines 
issued on 5 August. At the same time, they agreed that the amount of compensa-
tion for voluntary evacuees should be smaller than for official evacuees, and that 
pregnant women and children should receive a greater amount than others.38
In the end, DRC granted one-time payments of up to 400,000 yen for a pregnant 
woman or a minor (under the age of eighteen) and up to 80,000 yen for an adult in 
twenty-three municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture now designated as ‘voluntary 
evacuation zones’.39 This new scheme encompassed about 1.5 million residents in 
Fukushima (including approximately 300,000 pregnant women and minors) and 
was estimated to cost TEPCO nearly 200 billion yen (Asahi Shinbun, 7 December 
2011). Even though Fukushima residents and NGOs welcomed DRC’s decision as 
a step forward, they criticised it for failing to extend the compensation eligibility 
to more municipalities, to consider a wider range of nuclear damages and to adopt 
a long-term perspective on voluntary evacuation.40
Discussion: Realpolitik in the Constructivist Sense
These interactions between citizens and the government show that the real enemy 
of technical democracy is not technocracy. The dose limit that the government used 
to designate evacuation zones, 20 mSv per year, was disputed not only by counter-
experts aligned with antinuclear NGOs, but also by the official experts on NSC 
and DRC themselves: technocratic decision-making was impossible in the face of 
scientific uncertainty surrounding the causal relationship between radioactivity and 
human health. Once the scientific uncertainty of 20 mSv per year was exposed, the 
government considered non-scientific factors, such as administrative convenience, 
to modify its compensation scheme to provide one-time payments for voluntary 
evacuees in twenty-three municipalities. In the end, however, the government never 
expanded the official evacuation zone that it had earlier established using 20 mSv 
per year as a threshold.
Why did the government continue to use the scientifically disputed dose limit 
for its overall evacuation and compensation policies? We argue that this was due 
to the pre-disaster structure of Japanese policymaking, namely, the dominance of 
the bureaucratic government over the civil society (Curtis, 1999; Johnson, 1995). 
To begin with, the government had a large arsenal of legal instruments of coercion 
and hard social control, and regularly used it in a ‘Machiavellian’ way to overcome 
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resistance from the civil society (Aldrich, 2008). More importantly, the government 
has long maintained the façade of technocracy by heavily using expert commis-
sions. When ministries appoint commission members, they often select experts 
known to be sympathetic to their policy positions. Moreover, since ministries serve 
as secretariats of commissions and control agendas and draft recommendations, 
just as MEXT did for DRC, most commissions end up endorsing the policies that 
ministries wanted to promote in the first place (Iio, 2007, pp. 121–123; Shindō, 
2012, pp. 127–132). Put in the language of institutionalism (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977), expert commissions in Japan’s policymaking operate as ‘ceremonies’ that 
legitimate policy outcomes as ‘rational’ by decoupling the rhetoric of technocracy 
from actual, non-technocratic practices.
DRC’s ceremonial attempt to technically legitimate the government’s policies, 
however, failed in the dramaturgical sense (cf. Hilgartner, 2006). The dispute over 
the 20 mSv per year threshold continued among experts, and Fukushima residents 
and NGOs remained critical of the evacuation and compensation policies. But the 
government could afford to ignore the dramaturgical failure for two reasons. One 
was the significant power asymmetry between the civil society and the government: 
the former was consistently short on NGOs capable of policy analysis and advocacy 
activities that could effectively challenge the latter (Pekkanen, 2006; Schwartz & 
Pharr, 2003). While the nuclear disaster galvanised Japan’s civil society (Aldrich, 
2013), the civil society–government relations were not institutionally reconfig-
ured yet. Another reason was that the government did fulfill the minimum legal 
requirement, to establish DRC to create compensation guidelines. The ultimate 
rationality of the bureaucratic government is procedural validity, and it does not 
matter whether its decision is scientifically or socially rational. In this instance, 
technocracy is reduced to ‘procedurally rational domination’ in the Weberian sense 
(Weber, 1947), namely, a matter-of-fact way of conducting politics.
We argue that the government adopted the 20 mSv per year threshold to organ-
ise its evacuation and compensation policies because it wanted to downplay the 
magnitude of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster, and hence its responsibil-
ity. Since the 1950s, the government had consistently promoted nuclear power 
by propagating the so-called ‘safety myth’, emphasising Japan’s technological 
superiority and strict regulatory standards. As extensively documented by Japanese 
researchers (Hasegawa, 2011; Yoshioka, 2011) and the Diet investigative report 
(NAIIC, 2012), however, Japan’s nuclear safety had been seriously compromised: 
the regulators—NSC and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)—lacked 
the legal power to force the operators of the nuclear reactors to update their safety 
measures, not to mention the fact that NISA had been controlled by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry, a promoter of nuclear energy. Thus, in the aftermath 
of the nuclear disaster, the insufficient measures against earthquakes and tsunamis 
at the Fukushima Daiichi were partially blamed on the government’s incompetence 
in regulating TEPCO.
Yet, the government did not admit its responsibility for the nuclear disaster. 
Instead, the government held TEPCO entirely and solely responsible for the 
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nuclear disaster and its resultant damages. According to Article 2.3 in the Act 
on Compensation for Nuclear Damage, TEPCO could have been exempted from 
liability if the nuclear damage had been caused by ‘an unusually large natural 
disaster or social upheaval’.41 But the government rejected TEPCO’s request for 
exemption. TEPCO was also barred from filing for bankruptcy. A total amount of 
nuclear-damage compensation was already estimated to reach 3−5 trillion yen in 
the immediate aftermath of the nuclear disaster and TEPCO reported a loss of 247.3 
billion yen at the end of March (Endō, 2013, p. 143). However, the government 
foreclosed the option of bankruptcy for TEPCO and instead created the Nuclear 
Damage Compensation Facilitation Fund in September 2011 to help TEPCO 
financially.42 Although this compensation scheme was governmental because public 
funds, not loans, were injected into TEPCO, it framed TEPCO as the sole agent 
of nuclear-damage compensation, shielding the government from any liability for 
the nuclear disaster (Ōshima, 2011).
Thus, we argue that the bureaucratic government’s evacuation and compensa-
tion policies were fundamentally motivated by its ‘self-interest’ to defend its aura 
of legitimacy in the face of the nuclear disaster for which it had been responsible; 
downplaying the magnitude of the nuclear disaster in terms of evacuation zone 
and compensation coverage was the first step to evade its responsibility. To be 
sure, this was not realpolitik in the realist sense. The government’s self-interest to 
defend its legitimacy was historically conditioned by its longstanding pro-nuclear 
policy as well as the culture of the bureaucracy–the seniority-based promotion 
system and the resultant emphasis on loyalty to one’s own ministry make Japanese 
bureaucrats extremely reluctant to admit any mistake in their predecessors’ 
policies (Koga, 2011). Moreover, Fukushima residents and anti-nuclear NGOs 
mobilised counter-experts to successfully challenge the government’s dose limit 
and this forced the government to give a concession to voluntary evacuees in 
the form of one-time compensations. The government was therefore willing to 
recognise the constructed and contested nature of ‘scientific facts’ about health 
risks of radioactivity.
Nevertheless, the government decided on the coverage of nuclear-damage com-
pensation mainly out of administrative convenience and made it far more limited 
than what citizens demanded, not to mention the fact that the government refused 
to change its overall evacuation and compensation policies based on 20 mSv per 
year as the threshold. The government thus succeeded in minimising the impact of 
citizens’ challenge because the ‘naked power relations’ in the form of commission-
based policymaking—where the government could pick commission members 
and exclude citizens from deliberation—allowed political expediency to trump 
both democratic deliberation and technical rigour. In short, the government played 
realpolitik in the constructivist sense by exploiting formally rational procedures 
to dominate counter-experts and citizens, thereby marginalising both science and 
democracy in the process of policymaking (Hirakawa & Shirabe, 2015). ‘Naked 
power relations’ are no less real for having been constructed.
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Conclusion and Implications
In this article, we examined how Japanese citizens challenged the government’s 
evacuation and compensation policies in the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi 
Nuclear Disaster. In light of our analysis, we suggest that the possibility of techni-
cal democracy may be the smallest precisely when it is most needed—in the face of 
scientific uncertainty—depending on a given structure of policymaking. In the ideal 
world of technical democracy, the government would support robust debates on 
possible harms of scientifically uncertain phenomena and take precautionary meas-
ures (Callon et al., 2009). But, precisely in the ‘case of uncertainty, non-scientific 
input also is need, for example when discussing the balancing economic and social 
needs’ (Bijker, Bal & Hendriks, 2009, p. 164), thus creating the risk of sidelining 
science. The bureaucratic government and its expert commissions exercised enor-
mous power in the process of policymaking, especially in pre-disaster Japan. As a 
result, it was easier for the government to resolve policy controversies involving 
scientific uncertainty by political expediency based on existing power relations, 
than by technical-democratic deliberation based on dialogues with relevant actors 
who possessed heterogeneous knowledges and values.
Put another way, the most serious obstacle to technical democracy may not be 
technocracy because the latter is extremely rare, perhaps as unrealistic as realpolitik 
in the realist sense. Technocratic domination is only possible when all scientists 
agree on ‘facts’ or when the government completely monopolises the expertise on 
a given subject matter. Instead, our analysis suggests that the threat of realpolitik 
in the constructivist sense looms larger.
To fully understand the dynamics of citizen–government interactions in highly 
technical policy domains, however, it is also necessary to consider the role of 
political party vis-à-vis the bureaucratic government and expert commissions. 
For example, the ruling party at the time of the nuclear disaster, the Democratic 
Party of Japan (DPJ), was relatively receptive to disaster victims because some 
of its senior members, including Prime Minister Kan Naoto, had roots in socialist 
politics and civic movements. In fact, in June 2012, the DPJ government created 
the Act on Support for Children and Victims of the Nuclear Accident to provide 
support for children, pregnant women and voluntary evacuees.43 However, after the 
DPJ decisively lost the national election to the conservative, pro-nuclear Liberal 
Democratic Party in December 2012, implementation of the act slowed down.44 
Thus, the ruling political party, sitting on the top of the big Leviathan, can construct 
and mobilise ‘interest’, ‘naked power relations’ and ‘matters of fact’ differently.
In addition, the dynamics of citizen–government interactions are likely to 
vary across different policy domains because they involve different (a) actors and 
organisations and (b) types of expertise. The policy domain of nuclear safety, for 
example, pertains to nuclear physics, commonly regarded as extremely technical, 
and may inhibit citizen participation. In the domain of energy policy, corporations 
and their economistic interests may well complicate citizen–government interac-
tions. These within-case comparisons will help us clarify the mechanisms that 
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increase or decrease the risks of technocracy vis-à-vis the possibility of technical 
democracy.
In conclusion, we suggest that the recent ‘participatory turn’ in STS can be 
productive only if STS scholars work with deep knowledge of politics and poli-
cymaking, because policy outcomes in highly technical domains are shaped not 
only by science but also by power relations, economic interests, laws, and values 
and ethics, among other things (Epstein, 1996; Jasanoff, 1990). In recent years, 
this new, deeply political type of STS research has been advanced by David 
Hess (2007, 2011), Sheila Jasanoff (2005) and Shobita Parthasarathy (2010), 
among others, who have examined how government and civil society mobilise 
their respective scientific experts to justify or challenge policies in highly tech-
nical domains. We hope that this article contributes to this emerging sub-field 
in STS as well as the ongoing policy debate on how to best combine scientific 
expertise and citizen participation in dealing with policy problems caused by the 
nuclear disaster.
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